Clemson University

TigerPrints
Publications

English

1-2019

Invisible Memories: Black Feminist Literature and Its Affective
Flights
Jamie Ann Rogers

Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/english_pubs
Part of the Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Commons, and the Literature in English, North
America, Ethnic and Cultural Minority Commons

NOTICE WARNING CONCERNING COPYRIGHT
RESTRICTIONS

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United
States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other
reproductions of copyrighted material.
Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries
and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or
other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is
that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be "used for
any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or
research." If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a
photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of "fair
use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement.
This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a
copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment or the order
would involve violation of copyright law.

CHAPTER 11

Invisible Memories: Black Feminist Literature
and Its Affective Flights
Jamie Ann Rogers

When Audre Lorde traveled to Russia in 1976, she met an Eskimo woman
from the part of Russia closest to Alaska. The woman, Toni, sang a song
during a talk she gave about her people, the Chukwo, of whom only 14,000
were left. “It sent a chill down my spine at the time,” Lorde writes in an
essay about the trip, “because although there are 21 million Black Americans,
I feel like we’re an endangered species, too, and how sad for our cultures to
die” (1984, 32). Lorde recounts how the two met at a dinner put on by the
Union of Soviet Writers. They spoke intimately together all evening over
their meal. They could not decipher one another’s words without their
interpreters, two “blond Russian girls who smirked as they translated” (33).
And yet they made love, Lorde says. Through their eyes, then their hands,
touching each other’s knees, and soon, their lips, too. Toni made toast after
toast to women and strength. She toasted to joy, to sorrow, to hope, and, it
seems, to their bodies, which communicated more than their mediated
words ever could. Somehow, Lorde wrote, she felt connected. She was certain that she and Toni were the only people in the room at that moment
who shared the knowledge of being a people under threat.
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While intensely personal and singular, this story represents the unifying
principles of the theories of writing and political organizing that Lorde
spent her life’s work developing. Her work insists, for example, on a constant and reverential duty to one’s body and mind, to an examination of
what one feels as much as what one thinks, to the information that relations between self and other hold, as necessary starting points for any
struggle against oppression, against genocide, against erasure of the lives
and histories of women like her, women like Toni. Such insistence resonates with demands made by other Black feminist writers who were Lorde’s
contemporaries: The Combahee River Collective, for example, published
in 1977 its now well-known declaration for a proto-intersectionality that is
committed to the inherent value of Black women. Just a year later, June
Jordan issued her plea to define Black feminism as an act of self and communal love (“Where is the Love?”), and in 1983, Alice Walker published
her seminal In Search of Our Mother’s Gardens, in which she defined womanism—women who love women, women who love themselves, Black
women committed to the wholeness of entire people—as apposed (rather
than opposed) to feminism. These are among the many examples of Black
feminist writings that, in their insistence on the political significance of
communal and self-love, dismantle the subject-object dualism that acts as
the philosophical basis of Western modernity, and as the alibi for its history
of dehumanization of gendered and raced subjects. Such arguments prefigure by several decades the “affective turn”—declared by many theorists as
a profoundly “new” way to deploy critical thought—which is in many ways
committed to similar critiques of dualistic thinking.
In this chapter, I aim to contribute to the development of a genealogy
of affect theory that is attentive to these antecedents in Black feminist
thought, offering a corrective to the ways in which affect theory typically
is situated in intellectual histories as growing primarily out of late 1990s
queer theory, on the one hand, and debates around poststructuralism, on
the other. I highlight work by Lorde, Jordan, and Toni Morrison as representative examples, arguing that they not only offer compelling commentary on the workings of affect as political labor, but also are themselves
powerfully affective, producing “affective flights” that move within and
among readers, and become part of the affective circuits or “structures of
feeling” that condition the different realities in which we live.1
The study of rhetoric has long taught us to note that the force of words
has the potential to become part of the circulation of cultural memories and
histories. The historical continuity of anti-Black racism, however, demands
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a pointed examination of writings by and about Blackness and Black
women, Black history, and Black erasure that are part of the flow of thought
and emotion that exists in constant tension with other affective circuits,
including those produced through structures of white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity.
Contemporary affect theorists, especially those concerned with the
intersections of the biological sciences and the human sciences, tend to
describe affect as a product of the body’s innate biological response to
outside stimuli, often removing or de-emphasizing the subject’s agency.
Brian Massumi, for example, characterizes affect as autonomous “intensities” that, while related to the subject through the body, largely involve
the body’s indeterminate response to stimuli. Queer theorist Sara Ahmed
by contrast argues that affect is not necessarily autonomous, but rather a
bodily response that corresponds to preexisting and changing relations
(economic, political, or cultural, for example) with the affecting object.
Her interest in the cultural politics of emotions is more closely aligned
with the Black feminist literature I examine here, which insists on the
political relevance of intellectual critique of affective responses. Such critique involves taking seriously the examination of emotions, moods, and
temperaments that are produced through exterior stimuli—intersubjective
relations, encounters with environment, brushes with the historical, for
example. Such critique provides “information” about objects of affective
stimulation and their socio-historical character (Lorde); exposes
under-acknowledged material conditions that affect quality of experience
(Jordan); and unveils relationships between historical trauma and contemporary psychic damage (Morrison).
This chapter serves, in part, as an exposition of such intellectual labor,
offering readings of literature (both fictional and non-fictional) produced
through Black feminists’ investigations of their own affective responses to
structures of what bell hooks calls “white supremacist capitalist patriarchy” (1981).2 At the same time, the chapter argues that those very structures of domination contribute to the conspicuous under-citing of Black
feminists’ intellectual, political, and philosophical contributions within the
narrative of the genealogy of affect theory. (Jennifer C. Nash’s 2011 essay
“Practicing Love: Black Feminism, Love Politics, and Post-Intersectionality,”
and the more recent article by Claudia Garcia-Rojas, “(Un)Disciplined
Futures: Women of Color Feminism as a Disruptive to White Affect
Studies,” are two notable exceptions.) This despite clear evidence of the
influence such work has had on affect theorists.
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There is, of course, a cluster of scholars, especially scholars of color,
whose work focuses on interrogating racial formations and has become a
part of the dominant archive of affect theory, including Ahmed, Tavia
Nyong’o, Jasbir Puar, and José Muñoz. Additionally, Ann Cvetkovich
devotes a chapter of her latest book to a discussion of depression in relation to racism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide, and has acknowledged
Morrison and Black legal scholar Patricia Williams’ work as foundational
to her own methodologies (2012). Lauren Berlant focuses on juridical
citizenship and normative modes of belonging, which necessitates attention to racial assemblages. And before interest in affect could be said to
have built enough to constitute a “turn,” Avery Gordon’s compelling
work on the sociology of haunting locates a literary theory of affect within
Black feminist literature. In his discussion Gordon cites a talk given in
1989 by Wahneema Lubiano, who also develops a theory of affect in her
discussion of Alice Walker’s The Color Purple. Lubiano observes:
It seems to me that it is useful to consider engagement in the sentimental as
the excessive, the surplus corrective, to an imposed stoicism on Afro-
Americans…. Given the dearth of attention … to the emotional well-being of
marginalized others, such whole-hearted engagement with emotion is a way
of asserting a previously denied right to feel. (Qtd. in Gordon, 1997, 220)

However, despite the work being done on race by affect theorists, genealogies
of affect theory usually neglect this history, tracing its roots either to a biological theory of innate affects put forth by psychologist Silvan Tomkins,
which gained renewed interest in the early 1990s; or to related queer theory,
which began emerging at the same time, and tends to focus on theories of
affect related to emotions, embodiment, and everyday life; or to a Deleuzian
framework of biological and relational sensory phenomena, which entered
into the lexicon of contemporary affect theory in the early 2000s. More
recently, studies of affect have developed within the neurosciences, as evidenced by emergent subfields such as neuropolitics, neuroaesthetics, and
neurohistory. While the latter two strains are most strongly influenced by
discourses of their respective disciplinary contexts, be they in humanities,
social sciences, or natural sciences, they also frequently share an association
with the work of Gilles Deleuze’s translator, Brian Massumi. Massumi follows
Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s description of affect as “forces” or “intensities”
that pass from body to body (human and non-human alike), and that are
“autonomous” in the sense that intentionality has little to do with the ways
in which affect works on the body or on perception (1987). Affect can be
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thought of as the circulation of these forces or intensities between bodies, to
which bodies then respond, remaining in a constant state of becoming
through their encounters and interactions. For Massumi, affect is distinct
from emotion in that emotion is contextual, and affect is situational—it is
“the connecting thread of experience,” or that which is in excess of a particular body, escaping it, and coming into relation with (affecting) other bodies
(2002, 217). Emotion is the personalized context of affect—the perception
or naming that comes after an encounter charged with affect, too late for the
subject to attribute meaning to the affect itself. The political dimension of
this description of affect is of key interest here. As Massumi’s Politics of Affect
makes clear, affect is a political force, even if a “proto-political” one that must
be “brought out” and contextualized beyond its autonomy (2015, ix). I
would argue that it is precisely this “bringing out” that is imperative to earlier
Black feminist theorists.
The theorists of affect typically associated with queer theory do not
necessarily disagree with Massumi’s theorizing of affect as autonomous
and lacking intentionality, and certainly not its political function, but
rather are more concerned with understanding the relationship of affect to
the emotive process, and the ways in which that process is linked to history, normative disciplinarity, cognition, and political life. These theorists
might use the terms “emotion” and “affect” interchangeably, or they
might note subtle differences between the two. They might ask how emotions work on the body, how they influence everyday life, how they participate in cognitive processes, or how they act as subjugating and
subjectifying forces. The particular paradigm I wish to articulate understands the workings of affect as part of political, communal, and individual
organizing and subject-formation that necessarily and always functions
within raced and gendered configurations. The ways in which affect functions “autonomously” between bodies (be they human or non-human),
for example, is nevertheless predicated on the ways in which raced and
gendered structures of power situate those bodies, both intersubjectively
and spatially. Jordan’s lyric description of an architectural redesign of
Harlem offers a compelling case study of the affecting power of built environments, and of the relationship of that power to the regulation of space
and of the bodies that inhabit it, for example. The ghostly hauntings in
Morrison’s Beloved, as well, insist on the materiality of affective forces
across space and time, and Lorde’s explorations of emotions and sensory
experiences assert their relationship to affective histories of slavery and
anti-Black racism for Black and non-Black people alike.
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On Affect and Anger
Particularly elucidating here is Lorde’s speech “Uses of Anger,” given
before an audience made up of mostly white women at the 1981 annual
conference of the National Women’s Studies Association. That year’s conference title, “Women Respond to Racism,” was a response to the tensions
that had been building between the organization’s primarily white, middle-
class membership, and marginalized non-white feminists and women’s
rights activists. While the title gestures toward hoped-for ruptures in structures of oppression, the conference itself, somewhat infamously, was organized in a deeply racist way, a problem that Lorde’s speech addresses.
Lorde opens by stating that her response to racism is anger. She goes on
to narrate a series of exchanges she experienced that produced that anger.
Some examples:
• I speak out of direct and particular anger at an academic conference, and
a white woman, says, “Tell me how you feel but don’t say it too harshly
or I cannot hear you.” But is it my manner that keeps her from hearing,
or the threat of a message that her life may change?
• I wheel my two-year-old daughter in a shopping cart through a supermarket in Eastchester in 1967, and a little white girl riding past in her
mother’s cart calls out excitedly, “Oh look, Mommy, a baby maid!” And
your mother shushes you, but she does not correct you. And so fifteen
years later, at a conference on racism, you can still find that story humorous. But I hear your laughter is full of terror and dis-ease.
• A white academic welcomes the appearance of a collection of non-Black
women of Color.* “It allows me to deal with racism without dealing with
the harshness of Black women,” she says to me.
• At an international cultural gathering of women, a well-known white
american [sic] woman poet interrupts the reading of the work of women
of Color to read her own poem, and then dashes off to an “important
panel.” (1984, 125–26)

The narrative device of placing her audience (and later her readers when
the speech was reprinted in the anthology Sister Outsider in 1984) into
these quotidian stories through the use of first and second person has the
effect of circulating the affect that Lorde is describing, and in turn reproducing the anger and incredulity she herself felt. Her goal, she says, is not
to generate guilt among her white audience, but rather to explore the
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affect that racism in general, and racism in the context of the conference
specifically, engenders, and then to direct that affect toward change by, in
part, re-educating her audience about the value of anger. Anger, she says,
“is loaded with information and energy” and “[t]ranslated into action in
the service of our vision and future [it] is a liberating and strengthening
act of clarification” (2007, 127). Such translation necessitates looking
toward (rather than away from) the objects that produce anger in the first
place; that is, it necessitates turning toward and acknowledging those
deeply rooted material and psychic structures that condition everyday
interactions.
Lorde provides an example of the potential for the (mis)uses of, or
turnings away from, anger: A white woman witnesses an act of racism that
infuriates her, but rather than saying something, she remains quiet. Like
an “undetonated bomb,” Lorde says, the anger sits inside her, only to
explode onto the first Black woman to walk into the room; in other words,
the affect produced by an act of racism, while lacking intentionality as
affect, is translated into displaced anger when it sits unexamined, ready for
easy transference onto the historically and structurally pre-figured object
of blame: the Black woman.
The white woman’s anger and its transference holds information, Lorde
notes. Initially, it tells that woman that her first reaction of outrage is the
proper, liberal reaction to the racism that structures Western society. But
her secondary response, blaming the Black woman for her rage, tells her
that the same racism she condemns nevertheless structures her interior life
as well. Leaving the anger unexamined, she is easily able to transfer its
object from racism to the raced other. To conflate Lorde’s examples somewhat, a white woman at a conference on racism is able to say without irony
to a Black woman: “Tell me how you feel, but don’t say it too harshly. Tell
me how you feel, but don’t make me (the concerned non-Black questioner) uncomfortable. Tell me how you feel, but don’t make me feel you.
Because then I might feel your anger, too. And your message that, if I am
to be ethical, my life would have to change; the object of my anger would
have to be all those things—structural, material, social, emotional—that
make me me.” This realization is, as Lorde points out, terrifying; but, to
take the pursuit of social justice seriously, she says, is to take anger and its
rhizomatic relationship to structures of feeling seriously.3 For white
women, this means developing a politics of affect that is imbricated with
an ethics of allegiance with women of color. For both white women and
women of color, this means drawing out the historical references to which
that anger (along with other emotions that are responses to historical
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affects) relates to in order to examine it as both inside and outside the self,
moving such emotions from the private space of the individual into the
public space of the political.

The Affective Environment and Living Community
June Jordan’s well-known speech “Where is the Love?” (1978, published
1981) articulates self- and community-love as essential to Black liberation.
The kind of love she describes works on the body and through the body
toward changing sedimented attitudes, behaviors and structures of feeling, with changing material structures and everyday living conditions as
the ultimate horizon. Her work on urban planning is born of this perspective. However, the work’s subsequent dismissal from the canons of architecture and design is born of a world in which “women’s work”—especially
Black women’s work—“is all, finally, despised as nothing important, and
there is no trace, no echo of our days upon the earth” (145–46). Jordan’s
poetic description of the Harlem redesign project that she embarked upon
with architect Buckminster Fuller, for example, was dismissed as “utopian” by the editors of Esquire Magazine, where it was published, and the
project’s architectural design was attributed not to Jordan and Fuller, but
to Fuller alone. According to Jordan, she and Fuller fully intended the
plans to be implemented as part of federal reparations “to the ravaged
people of Harlem” (1981, 24). She titled her article “Skyrise for Harlem.”
Esquire renamed it “Instant Slum Clearance,” with a subhead reading
“R. Buckminster Fuller designs a total solution to an American dilemma:
here, for instance, is how it would work for Harlem.” None of the grace
and sensitivity toward the people of Harlem expressed in the article is
contained in those words. Nor is that grace expressed 50 years later in the
words of a May 18, 2015, Esquire article titled “6 Wild Predictions of the
Future from Esquire’s Archives,” with the subhead: “Some were close,
others not.” Jordan’s piece is listed as number six: “Giant towers will fix
Harlem.”
Unwittingly signifying the desperate need to historically contextualize
this entry, the only note accompanying the 2015 reprinting of Jordan’s
article is this: “An ambitious (and morally ambiguous) stab at redeveloping Harlem, the Judge Dredd-like towers from this article seem even more
dystopian today.” Far from “morally ambiguous” or dystopian (or utopian, as the earlier editors complained), the project was conceived by
Jordan with the needs of the current Harlem residents as its primary concern. In the preface to a letter to Fuller published in Civil Wars, Jordan
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presciently notes that one of her worries was that any plan for redevelopment of a Black neighborhood almost certainly means the eviction of
those Black people during reconstruction, and their inability to return
when they are priced out of the new neighborhood. Together, Jordan and
Fuller conceived of a way to build new buildings atop the old, while current residents could remain living in the lower portion of the towers.
When the new buildings were complete, the residents would move up into
them, and the old would be razed, freeing enormous ground for communal open space, something environmental psychologists and medical professionals have long noted as essential for healthy living.
Jordan’s aim with her article describing the plans was to complement
the visual presentation of the proposal, and “not simply explain/duplicate the visual presentation of our design” (25). She wanted to express
the affective quality of what she envisioned, give a sense for the feel she
expected to experience in the streets of New Harlem. And the feel she
was after aimed at nothing less than the “exorcism of despair” from the
city. The relationship between subject and object in living spaces “may
actually determine the pace, pattern, and quality of living experience,”
she asserts in the article (Jordan and Fuller 1965, 111). Architecture, in
many ways, creates that relationship. Every housing unit in her design
has at least 1200 feet of space compared to the current (at the time)
720 feet per family. Each unit would include a deck, and every room
would have a view. The units would begin at the tenth floor, above the
dust level and highway systems, and from each of these “[h]anging
gardens,” both local rivers would be visible (111). Jordan envisioned
circular walkways rather than the grid-design of sidewalks and streets
that produce “rigid confrontation of mass-against-mass” and that
“deaden space into monotonous experience” (111). Jordan and Fuller
also designed a roadway system that would disrupt the racial segregation of the highway and public transit systems, connecting Harlem to
other communities and parts of the city that were otherwise nearly
inaccessible for poor Harlem residents. Jordan closes the article with
the following entreaty:
Where we are physically is enmeshed with our deepest consciousness of self.
There is no evading architecture, no meaningful denial of our position. You
can build to defend the endurance of man, to protect his existence, to illuminate it. … If man is to have not only a future but a destiny, it must be
consciously and deliberately designed. (111)
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Utopian? Perhaps so, but only because a world in which a physical environment deliberately designed toward communal living, especially Black
communal living, was and remains but a thing of the (Black) imagination
and outside the scope of a white imaginary, which continues to dominate
architecture. Jordan’s poetic rendering of her and Fuller’s architectural
design offers a sense of the openness and freedom at which they aimed.
Her descriptions of the “hanging gardens” from which the flow of water
is visible allow one to imagine a world in which different worlds are possible, and offer a glimpse at the affect such a space could promote, affect
that evokes a life of flourish, rather than of mere survival. Jordan’s poem
“Sweetwater Poem Number One,” on the other hand, expresses the affect
created by the denial of such a space, by willful raced and gendered neglect:
You assume the buildings and / The small print roadways and / The cornered accidents / Of roof and oozing tar and ordinary concrete / Zigzag.
Well. / It is not beautiful. / It never was. / These are the shaven / Private
parts / The city show / Of what somebody means / When he don’t even
bother / Just to say / “I don’t give a goddam” / (and) / “I hate you.” (2007)

Affective Hauntings
I turn now to Toni Morrison’s novel Beloved (1987) as an example of the
ways Black feminist projects that began in the late 1960s were taken up in
the literature of later fictional works. I look to Beloved in part because of
its frequent citation by theorists of affect (Berlant and Ahmed, to name
just two)4 as noteworthy for its affective work, even if it is not specifically
thought of as a text articulating or prefiguring affect theory. I contend
that the novel and the discourse surrounding it offer insight into the political work that can be done through examination of the “information” that
affect holds. Both the narrative itself and Morrison’s extensive discussions
about her writing process, in fact, insist upon the examination of affect.
Morrison makes clear, however, that the process is at once crucial to the
articulation of histories and formulation of memories for African diasporic
subjects and is psychically threatening, a labor that must be undertaken
with great care and communal support. I refer to “diaspora” here both in
the immediate sense of geographical displacement of bodies, and in a
more removed sense, in terms of historical displacement. This second
meaning might be thought of as deep diaspora, whereby subjects experience dislocation intergenerationally as cultural memory. Through physical
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haunting in the form the ghost Beloved, as well as through the theorizing
of “rememory” throughout the novel, Beloved ties personal histories of
the protagonists to a mythical “we” of African diasporic peoples, suggesting that memory functions affectively, moving from body to body across
time and space.
Black music and oral storytelling were once privileged media in which
affects specific to the Black experience were transmitted and would generate cultural memory, according to Morrison. However, she argues that
Black music has been appropriated in such a way as to largely void it of
specificity, and oral storytelling no longer fits into the social fabric of Black
life. “We don’t live in places where we can hear [ancestral] stories anymore; parents don’t sit around and tell their children those classical, mythological, archetypal stories that we heard years ago. But new information
has to get out, and there are several ways to do it. One is the novel”
(2008, 58). The novel has the potential for an “affective and participatory
relationship between the artist or the speaker and the audience,” Morrison
goes on to observe, which requires “the reader to work with the author in
the construction of the book” to ensure the affective force is meaningful
or transformative (59). The movement between text and reader, between
what is said and left unsaid and then filled in by the reader, is what completes a novel, according to Morrison. This active relationality creates
emotional charge, and the story then moves within affective circuits of
history-making and memory-formation; it becomes part of the cultural
commentary and critique that shape subjective and intersubjective (thus
political) positions and experiences.
Such an understanding of the role of the novel shapes the construction
of Beloved, which fills in those “proceedings too terrible to relate” (1995,
90–91)—those elements left out of historiography outside the text and
left unsaid inside the text—with the creative and constructive impulse of
author and the (attentive) reader. Using a technique she describes as “literary archeology,” Morrison creates a history of slave subjectivity in
Beloved by taking seriously the “hints” of emotional and affective lives that
exist between the lines of the written record, as well as in oral histories and
her own experiences with her living ancestors. She takes seriously, she says,
the “memories within,” or what might be thought of as her own bumping
into the “rememory,” as protagonist Sethe calls it in Beloved, that exists
within the cultural practices of her intimate world. Quoting Zora Neal
Hurston’s opening passage from Dust Tracks on a Road: An Autobiography,
Morrison says, “Like the dead-seeming, cold rocks, I have memories
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within that came out of the material that went to make me” (1995, 92).
The development of the story of Sethe, in other words, is based as much
on Morrison’s own affective experience as a descendant of slavery as it is
on the written record of Margaret Garner’s life—the novelist relied on
what she came to intuit through her brushing up against subjects and
objects that hold historical, if incomplete, information through their cultural practices and meanings.
Within the narrative of the novel, the affect of absence is theorized
through Sethe’s articulations of “rememory.” More complicated than
memory, rememory is shaped by histories of collective trauma that leave
the former slaves who populate the novel haunted, scarred psychologically
and physically. Despite the effort on the part of the former slaves to escape
their memories and forge new worlds for themselves in the relative freedom of the north, it is always “there,” as Sethe remarks, “outside my
head” (36). Like the imprint of the baby ghost’s hands discovered by
Sethe’s living children on a cake, rememory hovers as a physical presence
in the landscape, detached from individual rememberers but shaping their
relations with each other and their environments and showing up as affective sensory experiences (3). “Someday, you be walking down the road
and you hear something or see something going on,” Sethe tells her
daughter Denver. “So clear. And you think it’s you thinking it up. A
thought picture. But no. It’s when you bump into a rememory that
belongs to somebody else” (36). Through Sethe, Morrison attempts a
negotiation with these repressed personal and collective memories, the
details of which exist only in fragments and circuits of feelings, only in
stories, rumors and hints that are passed on between community members. The story of Sethe’s killing of her child is one of the most devastating
of many examples in the novel.
While many have read the novel as a declaration for the psychological
necessity of recovering memory—both for the health of the novel’s characters and of present-day readers—it is equally, I would argue, a meditation on the trauma that recovering memories can engender. Morrison
theorizes the tension between the will to remember and the will to forget
through the conflicting intergenerational needs of Sethe and Denver,
Sethe’s only remaining child. Denver lives in a state of arrested childhood
for much of the novel, unable to engage with the world outside of 124
Bluestone Road, haunted by a family history that she knows only through
whispers and backward glances. She is nearly consumed by those absences
as they manifest in the physical form of her dead sister, the ghost Beloved,
when she appears as a full-grown woman. Her desire for Beloved, her
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desire to fill the gaps that Beloved’s previous absence represented, threatens to overtake Denver’s ability to exist in the present. Sethe as well is
nearly consumed on Beloved’s arrival. In an effort of self-preservation,
Sethe works throughout Denver’s childhood to maintain the gaps, to keep
at bay those proceedings too terrible to relate. The past cannot, however,
be fully contained. It appears in rememory, and in the very form of absence
itself: the baby ghost Beloved. When Paul D. attempts to exorcise that
ghost, it comes roaring back in the flesh as the grown woman Beloved,
fully claiming Sethe with her arrival. Sethe becomes submersed within the
(w)hole of her past, giving herself over to the girl who then “ate up
[Sethe’s] life, took it, swelled up with it, grew taller on it” (250).
The metaphor of haunting in Beloved, then, suggests movement of
affect across time and through generations. The devastating confrontation
with the guilt, shame, and terror of the past that the grown, fleshly
Beloved’s arrival brings for Sethe is foreshadowed through her encounters
with the affective forces, the rememory, produced by other seemingly
innocuous objects. One long passage, for example, describes the affective
force of the Ohio landscape:
[Sethe] worked hard to remember as close to nothing as was safe.
Unfortunately, her brain was devious. She might be hurrying across a field,
running practically, to get to the pump quickly to rinse the camomile sap
from her legs. Nothing else would be on her mind. The picture of the men
coming to nurse her was as lifeless as the nerves in her back where her skin
buckled like a washboard…. Nothing. Just the breeze cooling her face as she
rushed toward the water…. Then something. The plash of water. The sight
of her shoes and stockings awry on the path where she had flung them …
and suddenly there was Sweet Home rolling, rolling, rolling out before her
eyes, and although there was not a leaf on that farm that did not make her
want to scream, it rolled itself out before her in shameless beauty. (6)

Natural beauty, which could serve for Sethe as a respite, instead serves as
catalyst by which the terror of remembering and the danger of forgetting
combine. For Sethe, the “shameless beauty” of the plantation Sweet Home
and the sycamores—of the “[b]oys hanging from the most beautiful sycamores in the world”—is a physical manifestation of her conflicted relationship to memory: it is shameful to forget, but too painful to remember, and
so memories are displaced and distorted. Rather than one of pleasure, her
response to beauty’s affect is guilt and suppressed grief: “[T]ry as she
might to make it otherwise the sycamores beat out the children every time
and she could not forgive her memory for that” (6). Such a response
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implies what is later articulated by theorists as affect’s autonomy, calling
into question universalist assumptions about the pleasures of judgment,
especially for those who have been systemically denied access to pleasure.
Ultimately, the novel refuses any easy reconciliation. There is no sudden access to pleasure through cathartic confrontation with history or
beauty. Even when Beloved’s presence—both ghostly and fleshly—is
finally exorcised from 124 Bluestone Road, the affective charge of her having existed remains, if only in the wind, in footprints by the creek, in the
bittersweet everydayness of life as the novel’s characters carry on (275). As
the second death of Beloved suggests, rememory is a remnant, an affective
trace of a grief without end for the 60 million and more, as Morrison notes
in the novel’s dedication, who suffered under slavery and continue to suffer in its afterlife. In its representations of facing, and choosing not to face,
traumatic memories, Beloved asks: What is the price of bearing witness to
the affect that remains? What is the price of looking away?
Contemporary Black feminists such as Saidiya Hartman continue to
grapple with such questions in the present. Also pointing to the power of
narration to affect across time and space, Hartman notes that stories of
slavery are not stories about slaves themselves, nor about slavekeepers.
They are stories about their descendants, and what their descendants make
of the records that act as “failed witness” to the tragedy of slavery. Stories
like Beloved are stories of slavery’s survivors, of its descendants who bump
into the rememory that emerges from sycamore trees, from the landscape
of a ruined Harlem, from the love between women who share no history
but oppression. Can these types of narratives “provide an antidote to dishonor, and … a way to ‘exhume buried cries’ and reanimate the dead? Or
is narration its own gift and its own end … [a] way of living in the world
in the aftermath of catastrophe and devastation?” Hartman asks (2008, 3).
Perhaps not remedy, she suggests, but rather, these stories are part of a
historiographical operation that exists in “the conjunction of hope and
defeat” (14). Narrative, in other words, can’t ever speak the unspeakable
or recover histories forever lost. It can, however, articulate the affect of the
past that remains, and draw from the information it provides. Such stories,
entering into the affective circuits of the present, have the potential to
disrupt dominant structures of feeling, including those related to cultures
of white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity. An intellectual history of affect theory that tells the story of Black feminist thought within
it, in its own small way, has the potential to do just that.
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Notes
1. I use Raymond Williams’ term “structures of feeling” here to refer to the
complex of systems of beliefs, ideologies, and competing hegemonies that
often go unarticulated, but rather appear in senses of things or affective
social relations; what Williams described in Marxism and Literature as the
“affective elements of consciousness and relationships” (1997, 132). In my
work, I emphasize that such structures are variable across social and cultural
groups, and are in constant tension with competing local and global structures, as well as material and spatial conditions. Specifically, I argue that
systemic and structural racism, patriarchy, and heteronormativity are supported by fluid, but nevertheless dominant, structures of feeling, on the one
hand, and contested by variable and also fluid structures of feeling as they
manifest within marginalized communities, on the other.
2. bell hooks coins this term to describe contemporary interlocking systems of
domination in Ain’t I a Woman?: Black Women and Feminism. New York:
South End Press, 1981.
3. Deleuze and Guattari describe the organization of culture as rhizomatic
rather than hierarchical. The rhizome, they say, includes the best and the
worst of a thing. To understand culture as rhizome is to understand it as
ceaselessly establishing “connections between semiotic chains, organizations
of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles” (1987, 7). There are no universals to establish cultural mores in this
model, but rather relations of domination that produce normative cultural
modes. I use this term in connection with Williams’ “structures of feeling”
to emphasize the ways in which those structures are established—and contested—in part through the ceaseless connections between bodies, institutions, object, etc., that affects such as anger produce.
4. See Berlant’s The Female Complaint (2008), 66–67, and Ahmed’s The
Promise of Happiness (2010), 79–83.
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